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Abstract
This paper starts from the now widely-held premise that biodiversity conservation ought to
take place both inside and outside protected areas if biodiversity targets are to be met. Given
the potential inter-linkages of areas inside and outside protected areas in ecosystems, the ul-
timate structure of biodiversity conservation should be bioregional landscape management. A
framework for studying the factors a⁄ecting biodiversity conservation in bioregions is suggested.
While many factors might a⁄ect biodiversity conservation, the use of economic incentives is
argued to be potentially one of the most e⁄ective mechanisms for mainstreaming biodiversity
conservation in bioregions. Institutions are singled out as one important class of socio-economic
arrangements directly associated with economic incentives. Institutions are thus likely to be a
major determinant of the vulnerability or success of biodiversity conservation. The paper uses
South African examples, and concludes by outlining the research issues important in under-
standing the role of economic incentives in that context.
Keywords: biodiversity conservation, bioregions, economic incentives, institutions, main-
streaming
1 Introduction
Biodiversity conservation1 has traditionally been practised in protected areas. However, authors such
as Hansen and DeFries (2007) observe that many protected areas are not successfully conserving
biodiversity, often despite adequate management within their borders. They suggest that the major
reason for this could be the expansion and intensi￿cation of land use in the areas adjoining the
protected areas. Changes in land use outside protected areas can alter ecological function inside
protected areas and result in biodiversity loss given that protected areas are almost always parts of
larger ecosystems.
The concept of ecosystem management originated from the goal of managing regional landscapes
to maintain the ecological integrity of the protected areas contained therein. Since the early 1970s,
UNESCO has advocated for the management of the lands around protected areas along a gradient
of decreasing intensity of use towards the protected area boundaries. However, the abovementioned
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1We use the term ￿biodiversity conservation￿in the same way as Blignaut and Aronson￿ s (2008) use of the term
￿biodiversity maintenance￿which incorporates preservation, restoration and rehabilitation of biodiversity.
1conservation approach assumes that protected areas alone are capable of meeting biodiversity tar-
gets2 and therefore merely guaranteeing their persistence is su¢ cient to meet biodiversity targets.3
Indeed, there are many conservation priority areas outside of, often even far from, protected areas.
Also, the total size of area under conservation-friendly land use of one or another kind may be
functionally crucial. Thus, for successful biodiversity conservation, there is a need for bioregional
management, where the region in question encompasses the protected ecosystem or the unprotected
ecosystem or portions of both. For the purposes of this paper, the bioregion is simply either an
agglomeration of smaller areas, for instance, districts at a sub-national scale, or an agglomeration
of bigger areas at an adjacent, international scale, with some reason for being considered together.4
Good management inside the protected area may be relatively easy to achieve, but managing
outside the protected area requires ways to tackle heightened complexity. Merely applying protec-
tionist strategies outside protected areas, as inside the protected areas, will most likely not guarantee
the achievement of biodiversity goals and targets, due to the presence of other competing land uses.
Indeed, the biodiversity research community has responded to the challenge of biodiversity con-
servation outside protected areas by calling for mainstreaming biodiversity conservation in society
generally (Cowling, 2005). Mainstreaming entails changing the behaviour of individuals and organ-
isations towards the adoption of norms, values, and practices which promote biodiversity whenever
they make decisions that are likely to a⁄ect it, particularly outside of protected areas. The widely
cited mechanism of mainstreaming is e⁄ective communication of the issues to key stakeholders (ibid).
The most e⁄ective mechanism of mainstreaming may well be the tweaking of the economic con-
ditions of individuals and organisations, since biodiversity conservation can be seen as an economic
issue for two basic reasons. Firstly, biodiversity is a component of natural capital, which pro-
vides a ￿ ow of valuable ecosystem goods and services and therefore a source of economic wellbeing
(Millenium Ecosystem Assessment, 2005; Blignaut and Aronson, 2008). Secondly, the extent of bio-
diversity conservation outside protected areas is largely guided by the norms, values and practices
of market economies which promote the pursuit of economic optimisation objectives.5
Thus, a potentially e⁄ective mechanism for mainstreaming biodiversity conservation might be
the use of economic incentives.6 Economic incentives are potentially capable of binding actors
to support norms, values, and practices that promote biodiversity persistence. This paper seeks to
unravel the ways through which economic incentives can be used to enhance biodiversity conservation
in bioregions. It does so by presenting what is believed to be a widely-applicable generic framework,
but set in a predominantly South African context.
The structure of the rest of the paper is as follows. Section 2 suggests a conceptual framework
for studying the factors a⁄ecting biodiversity conservation in bioregions. Section 3 looks at the role
of economic incentives in bioregions. In section 4, institutions are singled out as one important
class of socio-economic arrangements directly associated with economic incentives and likely to be a
2Biodiversity targets in this instance are quantitative targets that tell us how much of a biodiversity feature needs
to be conserved in order to conserve a representative sample of biodiversity pattern and key ecological and evolutionary
processes. Targets are expressed as, for example, numbers of hectares of a land class. Biodiversity targets represent
thresholds or tipping points beyond which irreversible loss of ecosystem functioning or of species is likely to occur.
3This strategy might not assist biodiversity conservation very much because protected areas are not necessarily in
the right places, or not large enough, for conserving biodiversity. Initial protected areas placement was not necessarily
meant to achieve currently envisaged biodiversity targets. Furthermore, there may be critical biodiversity areas far
from the protected areas that are relegated to high intensity use in the above approach.
4It should be noted here that the South African Department of Environmental A⁄airs and Tourism￿ s (DEAT)
bioregion, de￿ned in South Africa￿ s National Environmental Management: Biodiversity Act (Act 10 of 2004), con-
tains ￿whole or several nested ecosystems and is characterised by its landforms, vegetation cover, human culture
and history￿. Furthermore, there is already a host of di⁄erent bioregion-type formulations: UNESCO biosphere,
World Heritage sites, Conservation International Hotspots, AWF Heartlands, Transfrontier Conservation Areas. The
principles developed in this paper generally apply to any chosen bioregion de￿nition.
5Biodiversity conservation is only one land use in a suite of alternative land uses forming the land use mosaic.
6Economic incentives refer to mechanisms that change the behaviour of actors with respect to economic choices
by altering their economic conditions. Positive economic incentives reward actors for complying with required actions
while negative economic incentives punish actors for non-compliance.
2major determinant of the vulnerability or success of biodiversity conservation in bioregions. Section 5
concludes by raising the key research issues that are important in understanding the role of economic
incentives in bioregions in South Africa.
2 The conceptual framework for studying the factors a⁄ect-
ing biodiversity in bioregions
Biodiversity conservation requires land. Thus, the extent of biodiversity conservation in a bioregion
will depend on the con￿guration of the land use mosaic in that bioregion. A number of di⁄erent land
uses including ￿ pure￿conservation, crop agriculture, livestock farming, natural resource harvesting,
rural settlements, urban centres, logging, mining, other commercial industries, etc., can comprise
the land use mosaic. The land use mosaic re￿ ects people￿ s value systems and management choices in
response to a range of social, technological, ecological, economic and political driving factors (Biggs
et al., 2004; DeFries et al., 2007). Thus, ultimately the extent of biodiversity conservation in a
bioregion depends on a myriad of factors a⁄ecting land use decisions by a collection of stakeholders.
In this section, we present a conceptual framework for exploring the factors that in￿ uence the
con￿guration of the land use mosaic in a bioregion and therefore biodiversity conservation in that
bioregion (see Figure 1).7
As indicated earlier, the con￿guration of a land use mosaic (Figure 1, Box 1.1) and therefore
biodiversity conservation in that mosaic is shaped by a range of factors. Within the localised socio-
ecological-economic system, land use dynamics are determined by (i) people￿ s assets in the form of
the di⁄erent types of capital they have at their disposal at any given time (Figure 1, Box 1.2), (ii) the
various systems of tenure which underpin the land use mosaic (Figure 1, Box 1.3), (iii) the extent of
regional development (Figure 1, Box 1.4), and (iv) the economic approaches used in decision-making
(Figure 1, Box 1.5).
People￿ s asset registry consists of ecological, ￿nancial, physical, human and social capital (Scoones,
1998; DFID, 1999), as well as cultural capital (Figure 1, Box 1.2). Ecological capital refers to the
ecological system and nature, which provides a range of ecosystem goods and services to support
human livelihoods and well-being. Direct, tangible bene￿ts from nature include the use of timber,
￿rewood, medicines, food, water, honey, grazing land etc., for a variety of di⁄erent landowners and
user groups (Millennium Ecosystem Assessment, 2003; Kumar, 2005). Indirect bene￿ts are nutrient
cycling, water provision, groundwater recharge and bioremediation. In addition, intangible bene￿ts
include reviving or strengthening people￿ s spiritual, cultural, traditional and aesthetic connections
with the ecological system and nature. Hence, the natural potential of the land plays an important
role in determining which land use options are open to the landowner or user (Aalders, 2008).
Financial capital includes cash, savings and investments, and underpins both formal and informal
trade in ecosystem goods and services (Kumar, 2005).8 Physical capital comprises infrastructure,
telecommunications and transport networks, where having the appropriate infrastructure and equip-
ment can help reduce labour costs and improve productivity, and thus, facilitate trade and industry
(Jansen et al., 2006). Human capital refers to people￿ s skills and expertise, where being able to access
current knowledge and innovations enables the use of environmentally sound practices, and promotes
sustainable resource use and conservation (Kumar, 2005). Social capital constitutes social networks
and relationships, which enable the sharing of resources (including knowledge) in kinship and across
7Mathematically, this framework can be represented at the aggregate level as a system of the following two si-
multaneous equations: Biodiversity conservation=f(land use mosaic); Land use mosaic=g(values, social factors,
technological factors, ecological factors, economic factors, political factorsj economic approaches used by economic
agents) and the following reduced form equation: Biodiversity conservation=h(values, social factors, technological
factors, ecological factors, economic factors, political factorsj economic approaches used by economic agents).
8The use of ecosystem goods and services by local communities also serves a safety net function in times of hardship,
and also plays a cost saving role, as the money saved by not having to pay for basic requirements can be used for
other household purposes (Emerton, 2001; Shackleton and Shackleton, 2004).
3business interests, diversi￿cation of risk across activities, access to new or more diverse markets, and
facilitates the marketing and promotion of products (ibid). Cultural capital includes people￿ s belief
systems, customs and traditions, which in￿ uence their natural resource use and management, with
particular relevance to traditional or indigenous communities.
However, it is having an adequate combination of these capitals that can unlock development
opportunities for the landowner or user. For example, membership in a social group (social capital)
may be necessary for access to certain land tenure rights (natural capital) that is necessary for access
to credit (￿nancial capital), which in turn, is needed to purchase inputs to take advantage of a new
market (Meinzen-Dick and Adato, 2001). Hence, the di⁄erent types of capital which people possess
determine resource restrictions on the nature of development opportunities available to them (e.g.
type of development, size and scope of the development, etc.).
Moreover, all development opportunities are subject to institutional constraints in terms of formal
laws of access and use rights to land and resources, as well as informal rules, taboos or codes
of conduct, particularly with regard to traditional leadership and natural resource management
practices (Ostr￿m, 1990; Grundy and Michell, 2004). Although direct evidence of the relationship
between landowners￿decision-making and land use (including land cover) is di¢ cult to obtain due
to con￿dentiality issues, there is some evidence that land ownership represents the unit for decision-
making, as forests have been actively maintained along straight-lined boundaries as opposed to the
di⁄use boundaries of natural forest patterns (Jansen et al., 2006). In this instance, it is probable
that secure tenure and use rights over forest management created an incentive for people to conserve
or protect this vegetation type.
Hence, this framework recognises four major types of tenure which span rural, urban and peri-
urban settings, all of which may occur within a particular bioregion. They are state-owned land,
communal land, private land and commons (Figure 1, Box 1.3). State-owned land is managed by
the state with controlled access to individuals and communities for various resource use purposes
(Grundy and Michell, 2004). Communal land refers to a type of tenure arrangement whereby a
community or ￿ contiguous group of people with like skills, socio-economic background and attitude￿
(Fabricius, 2004) are assigned rights of ownership to land by the state, and collectively make decisions
about its use (Grundy and Michell, 2004; Reid and Turner, 2004). Private land refers to a type of
tenure arrangement whereby an individual or private enterprise is assigned rights of ownership and
use to land (Grundy and Michell, 2004). Commons constitute state-owned land, usually along the
periphery of urban centres, e.g. towns or cities, which can be hired out for use by the public but
which are often used by all people as ￿ open access￿areas due to a lack of excludability.
It is important to understand how resources ￿ ow between these various types of tenure arrange-
ments within a bioregional land use mosaic to promote its sustainable development (Ostr￿m, 1990;
World Resources Institute, 2005). Joint venture partnerships between the state, local communities
and the private sector, encourages a cross-￿ ow of resources between di⁄erent stakeholders and across
di⁄erent tenure arrangements (i.e. state, communal and private) to promote biodiversity conserva-
tion, local economic empowerment and capacity building. For example, new legislation on forest
management in South Africa, namely the National Forests Act (No. 84 of 1998), makes allowances
for the management of state forests, as well as indigenous forests on communal land, and underpins
the Participatory Forestry Management (PFM) programme, championed by the Department of Wa-
ter A⁄airs and Forestry (Grundy and Michell, 2004; Willis, 2004). This necessitates granting local
communities access to state forests for the harvesting of ecosystem goods and services to reduce
poaching, as well as the state providing an extension service to local communities to empower them
to use and manage their own resources in a better way. However, for local communities to begin to
conserve resources, it is important that they identify the value in doing so for subsistence, traditional
or customary and commercial purposes. With regard to the latter, private sector partners often play
an important role in the training and capacity-building of local communities, and help to connect
them to formal product markets. The partnership works because local communities grow their social
and ￿nancial capital while their private sector partners can cut management and operational costs.
4People￿ s asset registry can also interact with the land tenure system to in￿ uence land ownership
and land use practices (Gupta, 1999; Lebel et al., 2006). For example, local communities with
strong cultural capital (i.e. good local knowledge, strong collective memory and a tendency to
value a traditional lifestyle), may be more likely to engage in conservation and/or nature-based
tourism activities that build on these assets (e.g. cultural villages) than more ￿ western￿tourism
initiatives. In contrast, the Makuleke land claim on part of the Kruger National Park witnessed
the local community invest in a luxury game lodge and wildlife safaris, arguably at the expense of
their local culture (Reid and Turner, 2004). Thus, the extent to which local communities engage in
conservation and protect their local culture is an area that still requires further research.
The extent of regional development, measured by indicators such as income, employment, health
and food consumption (Figure 1, Box 1.4), impacts on the land use mosaic (Biggs et al., 2004), and
feeds back to strengthening or weakening the asset base and making people more or less vulnerable
to external factors (Meinzen-Dick and Adato, 2001). The challenge remains that of providing incen-
tives for land uses complementary to conservation, and disincentives for land uses con￿ icting with
conservation within the bioregion. For example, along the southern Cape coast of South Africa,
the coastal forests of Tsitsikamma National Park and Wilderness National Park are managed for
multifunctional sustainability. This means that the forests are managed for biodiversity conserva-
tion, small scale timber logging (where trees displaying early signs of mortality, across their age and
size class distributions, are selected, logged and sold under auction, predominately to the furniture
industry), as well as for the sustainable use of non-timber forest products by local communities (e.g.
harvesting of seven week ferns for ornamental purposes, collection of tree seedlings for propagation
in community nurseries etc.). Taken on its own, the small scale timber logging activities operate
at a net loss of R3.5 million/annum. However, the downstream bene￿ts justify timber logging as
a complementary land use to biodiversity conservation, and promote this type of land use option
above others such as mining, which would potentially provide greater short- to medium-term eco-
nomic returns but which would con￿ ict with conservation because of the destructive nature of the
mining process.9
The framework also assumes that there is a set of economic approaches that landowners and users
consult as rules of thumb to guide their land use decisions (Figure 1, Box 1.5). The ￿rst rule of thumb
is that the bene￿ts of an intervention, land use or development initiative must outweigh the costs, and
the second rule is that any type of intervention needs to be cost-e⁄ective in achieving the desired goal.
Borrowing from conventional consumer economic theory, approaches such as cost bene￿t analysis
and the assessment of the cost e⁄ectiveness of institutions that underpin people￿ s land use decisions
can help to identify such incentive and disincentive mechanisms. Environmentally adjusted cost
bene￿t analysis quanti￿es, as far as is possible, the total bene￿ts (i.e. ecological, ￿nancial, physical,
human, social and cultural bene￿ts) from practicing a particular land use, measured in terms of
the satisfaction gained by the landowner or user. However, as not all bene￿ts can be maximised
concurrently (e.g. conservation and mining), the use of land and/or the ecosystem goods and
services it provides for a particular purpose comes at the cost of using the same land for another
purpose (More et al., 1996). Environmentally adjusted cost bene￿t analysis also quanti￿es, as
far as is possible, the total costs (i.e. ecological, ￿nancial, physical, human, social and cultural
costs) incurred by the landowner or user to utilise land or other ecosystem goods and services for a
particular purpose (Pearce and Turner, 1990; Field, 2002). But it is the trade-o⁄ between the costs
and bene￿ts that determines people￿ s land use decisions, where the option that yields ￿ good enough￿
net bene￿ts is favoured over others (Sent, 2004).
Consequently, this framework draws on the theory of bounded rationality, and assumes that
landowners and users refer to a stable set of rules (i.e. rules of thumb) by which to make their land
use decisions, acting with incomplete knowledge (i.e. not knowing all past and future possibilities),
9The downstream bene￿ts from timber logging (only) include R5.8 million/annum in taxes to the state, a contri-
bution of R20 million/annum to the regional Gross Domestic Product and 640 jobs, which ultimately contributes to
poverty alleviation, improved incomes and increased food security (Armin Seydack, personal communication).
5towards meeting a speci￿c target (near but not necessarily the optimal choice) (Gans, 1996; Sent,
2004). Therefore, the user￿ s learning involves changing their choices on the basis of past outcomes
to move nearer towards optimality (Sent, 2004). If the rules work well, they are retained and re￿ned
by the user whereas if the rules work poorly, they are used less and less, and eventually abandoned
(Aumann, 1997).
It must also be acknowledged that other external factors can impact on biodiversity conservation
in the bioregion (Biggs et al., 2004). External ecological factors (Figure 1, Box 2) including natural
disasters such as droughts, ￿ oods, biological invasions and climate change can have direct impacts
on land use choices and biodiversity conservation outcomes. External socio-economic factors (Figure
1, Box 3) including political change (e.g. change in the ruling party), economic change (e.g. change
in market prices) and institutional change (e.g. emergence of new institutions and power players)
can in￿ uence tenure arrangements, development opportunities and land use options.
Other key elements of the framework are that it is dynamic through space and time (Gunderson
and Holling, 2002), inclusive of formal and informal conservation (e.g. conservation ranging from
formal protected areas to local taboos over protected or sacred forests) and embraces the principles
of adaptive management (Biggs and Rogers, 2003) acknowledging multiple sustainable development
options and strategies for a particular region. On the scale issue, the relative importance of the
ecological, social and economic components may di⁄er across scales. For example, at the scale of
a park, ecological objectives such as conserving ecosystem functions, or in some cases, restoring
ecosystem functions and processes and promoting habitat heterogeneity may take precedence over
social objectives such as maximising the tourist experience, or economic objectives such as ensuring
that the park is ￿nancially self-sustaining (Du Toit, Rogers and Biggs, 2003). However, a park forms
part of a wider network, whereby it is possible to cross-subsidise the economically less productive
parks, thus justifying their existence despite operating at a loss, and in￿ uencing the importance of
di⁄erent ecological, social and economic factors with scale.
3 The role of economic incentives in biodiversity conserva-
tion in a bioregion
As shown in ￿gure 1, the decision about land use is made using particular economic approaches which
assess the economic incentives or disincentives generated by a range of factors. Thus, what makes
biodiversity conservation a preferred land use is the associated structure and magnitude of economic
incentives in the range of factors that landowners and users consider in land use choice. As such, the
way to a⁄ect the land use choices would be to tweak the economic incentives to which landowners
and users experience respond. As will be argued later, it should be possible for landowners and
users to experience new economic incentives from the existing range of driving factors or a modi￿ed
range of driving factors such that they can be in￿ uenced to make land use choices which favour
biodiversity conservation. This section unravels the range of economic incentives that can be used
to in￿ uence the land use choices in favour of biodiversity conservation.
Biodiversity conservation plays an important role in creating opportunities and challenges that
ultimately impact the sustainable development of a bioregion. This is because sustainable develop-
ment implies the use and management of resources to provide bene￿ts for the current generation
without compromising the options available to future generations (Kumar 2005). Central to the
concept of sustainable development is conservation, as it is through the act of valuing resources that
people may begin to understand the need to conserve them for future generations (Du⁄y, Corson
and Grant, 2001).
Moreover, the ecological system provides a number of ecosystem goods and services to society,
either directly or indirectly, upon which economies and development are dependent. Yet despite
this seemingly mutualistic relationship, many ecosystems have been unsustainably used and man-
aged (Millennium Ecosystem Assessment, 2003; Biggs et al., 2004; Kumar, 2005). Biodiversity
6conservation has tended to be unsuccessful because (i) it usually has ￿public good￿characteristics
of non-excludability and indivisibility, which makes its provision prone to free-riding behaviour, (ii)
economic agents interact with biodiversity through various systems of tenure such as ￿open access￿ ,
which usually creates incentives for accelerated rates of use due to the lack of assurance that bio-
diversity resources saved in the present will be available in the future, and (iii) biodiversity might
not, in an economic sense, successfully compete against other land uses which o⁄er better livelihood
options.
It is also believed that poor use and management of ecosystems has resulted because conven-
tional economic approaches have been unable to capture their ￿ true￿value, and are often limited to
situations where ecosystems are relatively intact and functioning properly (Emerton 2001a; Fabri-
cius et al., 2004).10 While that may be true, it could be the case that weak incentive inputs into
conventional economic approaches of decision-making result in the unsustainable use and manage-
ment of ecosystems. For example, one of the reasons communal landowners and users invest in
agriculture or livestock farming rather than biodiversity conservation is the di⁄erence in scale and
distribution of the costs and bene￿ts of the alternative land uses.11 For communal landowners and
users, the bene￿ts from agriculture or livestock farming are high (e.g. they may generate a diversity
of products such as crops, meat and milk for subsistence and commercial use) while the costs are low
and may consist of labour and transport expenses (Shackleton, Shackleton and Cousins, 2001). The
net bene￿ts are positive albeit at the local scale often because of poor infrastructure and the lack
of access to markets (Ashley, 1996). In comparison, the bene￿ts from biodiversity conservation are
low because the associated capital costs and management expenses of supporting big value, highly
mobile wildlife species exceeds that of agriculture or livestock farming, and generally requires greater
inputs in terms of resources (e.g. land, fencing, game guards etc.) in order to turn a pro￿t. Thus,
the net bene￿ts are negative (Ashley, 1996; Tisdell, 2004).
The threat of the possibility of (i) free riding behaviour, (ii) open access tenure, (iii) failure
of biodiversity to provide livelihoods, and (iv) the use of non-comprehensive economic approaches,
together create the need to constrain or synergise human and enterprise actions with regards to
their interaction with biodiversity. One could do this by use of (i) command-and-control system
or (ii) economic incentives. Each of these options is likely to be better in particular circumstances
￿it mainly depends on the nature of the threat to biodiversity. However, while a command-and-
control system imposes certain restrictions on people￿ s access to, and use of resources, using a
top-down approach to conservation-orientated regional management, economic incentives work with
human behaviour to in￿ uence people￿ s land use choices, using a more subtle bottom-up approach.
Consequently, the former requires greater enforcement and policing than the latter. Thus, the
more biodiversity is conserved through economic incentives, the more resources become available to
conserve economically unviable and institutionally unprotected ecosystems.
Thus, economic incentives are required which increase the bene￿ts of biodiversity conservation to
local residents and increase the costs of alternative land uses (e.g. agriculture or livestock farming)
in order to level the playing ￿eld. Economic incentives need to overcome the sources of biodiversity
conservation market failures. A number of di⁄erent economic incentives have been applied in di⁄erent
contexts, which have either direct or indirect linkages to conservation. Economic incentives such as (i)
the promotion of value-adding activities (e.g. trophy hunting and up-market tourism), (ii) providing
appropriate and adequate compensation for damages incurred by damage causing animals and (iii)
revenue-sharing by tourist hunters (e.g. tourist levies paid to communal landowners on whose
land hunting concessions are set up) provide direct and strong linkages to conservation (Ashley,
1996; Secretariat of the Convention on Biological Diversity, 2001; Emerton, 2001b; Kumar, 2005).
10The latter is of particular signi￿cance to developing countries, where signi￿cant trade-o⁄s exist between conser-
vation or restoration of ecosystem functions and processes and economic development, and decisions often go the way
of big corporations (Kumar, 2005).
11Of course, in many cases, livestock farming can be compatible with biodiversity conservation (e.g. in succulent
karoo and grasslands, there are e⁄orts to encourage appropriately managed grazing as a biodiversity compatible land
use).
7Indirect economic incentives may include (i) training and capacity development from joint venture
partnerships with government and the private sector, (ii) stimulating underdeveloped or inaccessible
markets, and (iii) government support or grants from NGOs and donors for local development and
infrastructure to compensate for biodiversity conservation￿ s positive externalities not re￿ ected in the
market (Ashley, 1996; Secretariat of the Convention on Biological Diversity, 2001; Emerton, 2001b;
Kumar, 2005).12
Similarly, a range of economic incentives has been employed to encourage private landowners
to support conservation and complementary land uses in di⁄erent contexts. These include (i) con-
servation levies, (ii) subsidies for the cost of habitat restoration, protection and conservation, (iii)
subsidies on marketing certain species (where their value is too low to make their conservation eco-
nomically viable for a private landowner), (iv) tax concessions for conservation activities on private
land (at least as generous as those allowed for alternate productive land uses), (v) adequate com-
pensation for damages incurred by animals, (vi) voluntary contributions for conservation e⁄orts on
private land (Ashley, 1996; Emerton, 2001b; Tisdell, 2004), (vii) the elimination of perverse subsidies
that negate biodiversity conservation (and, where possible, transfer of these subsidies to payments
for non-marketed biodiversity conservation), (viii) taxes or user fees for activities with ￿external￿
costs to biodiversity, (ix) creation of markets to reward biodiversity conservation, (x) payment for
ecosystem services, and (xi) biodiversity o⁄sets (Millenium Ecosystem Assessment, 2005).
In compensating for ecosystem goods and services, there are mainly two types of arrangements;
public ￿scal payment and market-based instruments. It is believed that ￿scal arrangements are prone
to a number of shortcomings, such as high transaction costs, low e¢ ciency in fund use and ambigu-
ity in target bene￿ciaries, e.g. funds for community-based natural resource management (CBNRM)
projects are sometimes used for local economic empowerment and capacity-building initiatives rather
than to promote strong linkages between sustainable resource use, community bene￿ts and conserva-
tion, which is the central principle of CBNRM. Likewise, market-based instruments do not function
without challenges. They require clearly de￿ned tenure for ecosystem goods and services, measurable
bene￿ts and low transaction costs, which implies a relatively well-developed market infrastructure.
For developing countries, such conditions are often illusive (Kumar, 2005).
Another challenge is deciding whether indirect or direct payments for ecosystem services would
be more e⁄ective. A price premium on environmentally sustainable and eco-friendly products is an
example of an indirect payment while a transaction between downstream and upstream water users
for water allocations is an example of a direct payment. Both types of arrangements for ecosys-
tem services require institutions that are proactive and e⁄ective. However, where indirect payment
mechanisms are often plagued by their ambiguous impact on conservation incentives, complex re-
quirements for implementation, and the mismatch between the scale of management and scale of
impact on the ecosystem, direct payment mechanisms can be carefully designed to cater to the re-
quirement for protecting entire ecosystems or speci￿c species, with diverse institutional arrangements
set up between multiple stakeholders (ibid).
It is di¢ cult to predict the spin-o⁄ e⁄ects and feedbacks of a particular incentive mechanism.
For example, where landowners were assigned conditional use rights over certain wildlife species
in Australia in order to promote their conservation, and the conservation of their habitat, this
incentive mechanism in some cases resulted in a negative feedback e⁄ect. While wildlife species
of high economic value (e.g. crocodiles) were conserved and their numbers enhanced, species of
lesser economic value were targeted for removal because the costs of their conservation were too
high (particularly in the case of highly mobile species and species with large home ranges), and they
competed with the economically favoured species for resources (Tisdell, 2004). This highlights the
12By providing communal landowners and users with a well-functioning social grant system to support communal
landowners and users that (hopefully) practice complementary land uses to conservation, the pressure on ecosystem
goods and services to supplement rural incomes, and perform a traditional safety net function can be somewhat
alleviated, and in so doing, contribute to biodiversity conservation inside and outside of formal protected areas
(Wolmer, 2003; Shackleton and Shackleton, 2004; Hansen and DeFries, 2007).
8importance of monitoring and evaluation conservation interventions, and of utilising the principles
of adaptive management.
Thus, it is necessary for the economic approaches used to capture, as far as is possible, the
￿ true￿value of the various land uses within a region, and to be able to assess how cost-e⁄ective
or e¢ cient various alternative economic incentives will be in achieving the desired sustainable de-
velopment goals. It is important to recognise that biodiversity contributes to the production of
ecosystem services. Most resource management decisions are strongly in￿ uenced by the need for
trade in ecosystem services in formal markets such that the non-marketed bene￿ts are not lost or
degraded (Millenium Ecosystem Assessment, 2005). These non-marketed bene￿ts are often high and
sometimes more valuable than the marketed ones. In order to enhance biodiversity conservation,
it is imperative that decisions be improved by considering the total economic value of alternative
land uses. Similarly, it is imperative that the relative values of biodiversity conservation experienced
by decision-making units be enhanced. Economic incentives constitute the means to enhance such
values for decision-making units. Biodiversity usually compares more favourably to alternative land
uses after incorporating the value of ecosystem services.
Towards this purpose, a combination of direct preference methods, which study behavioural
changes in simulated or hypothetical markets, and indirect preference methods such as travel cost
models and hedonic valuation, which infer values from data on behavioural changes in actual markets,
may be used to capture direct and indirect, tangible and intangible values of particular land uses
and resources (Kumar, 2005). Even if biodiversity does not fare well in a cost-bene￿t analysis that
is not necessarily a cause for concern in programme implementation ￿it simply signals the kind of
intervention that needs to be used, if it is decided that biodiversity conservation ought to take place.
4 The importance of institutions in enhancing biodiversity
conservation in bioregions
As outlined in the previous section, there is a need to unravel the range of economic incentives that
a⁄ect biodiversity conservation in bioregions. In promoting biodiversity conservation, one require-
ment is that the programme of biodiversity conservation should be successful. Another requirement
is that, in achieving some set biodiversity targets, the programme must cost as little as possible to im-
plement, given that there are always budget constraints. Use of economic incentives can potentially
help to satisfy these requirements.
The workability of the programme can be investigated using at least two approaches: cost bene￿t
analysis and the institutions approaches. Cost bene￿t analysis as a way to probe the workability
of biodiversity conservation programmes is generally being mainstreamed, even though decisions
can be improved if they are informed by the total economic value of alternative land uses. On the
other hand, one class of socio-economic arrangements called ￿institutions￿ , directly associated with
economic incentives, remains unexplored.
In this context, ￿institutions￿refer to formal and informal laws, rules, codes of conduct, norms
and strategies adopted by individuals operating within and across organisations; they exist in the
minds of the participants, and are sometimes shared as implicit knowledge rather than in an explicit
and written form (Ostrom, 1990). Thus, in a very general sense, institutional arrangements can
be de￿ned as the rules that govern the interaction with natural resources (see e.g., Hertzler, 2007);
such rules confer a spectrum of rights over natural resources.13 Institutions a⁄ect human livelihoods
through in￿ uencing people￿ s access to assets, livelihood strategies, vulnerability to external factors,
and terms of exchange (Meinzen-Dick and Adato, 2001). They operate across multiple spatial and
temporal scales and within all spheres (i.e. public and private) to signi￿cantly in￿ uence conditions
13Agrawal and Ostrom (2001) provide a useful framework for distinguishing between di⁄erent types of rights. They
suggest that di⁄erent bundles of rights can be identi￿ed in terms of rights of access, withdrawal, management, exclusion
and alienation.
9that promote sustainable development (i.e. income, employment, health and food consumption).
Institutions determine various biodiversity conservation outcomes. There is a need to ensure that
the institutional arrangements generate enough economic incentives for sound biodiversity conserva-
tion. Investigating the workability of a biodiversity conservation programme under the institutions
approach requires an analysis of the institutions in a particular jurisdiction and judging whether
they are conducive for the workability of the programme or whether institutional change ought to be
recommended. Thus, the knowledge of how institutions function in relation to humans/enterprises
and their interaction with biodiversity is critical to the design and implementation of e⁄ective bio-
diversity conservation. The rest of this section looks speci￿cally at how institutions in￿ uence the
decisions for land use in any particular region and consequently, how those decisions a⁄ect biodiver-
sity conservation under bioregions.
Institutions in￿ uence the decisions for land use, investment, natural resource use and therefore
biodiversity conservation. With strong, appropriate institutions, investment in biodiversity conser-
vation improves as the ￿nancial value of biodiversity approaches its total economic value. In the
literature, the investigation of how institutions in￿ uence the decisions for land use and biodiversity
conservation has focussed on the engagement of local communities in biodiversity conservation by
protected area management. The ultimate goal has been for protected area managers to be able to
in￿ uence land use decisions outside protected area boundaries. This has been necessitated by the
fact that the land use decisions that the protected area managers have often/sometimes wanted to
in￿ uence outside protected areas have been made mainly by local communities, as opposed to big
commercial interests such as commercial agriculture, mining and property developers.
Further, the literature suggests that the centrepiece of this focus on the engagement of local
communities in biodiversity conservation by protected area management, where the main pressure on
the ecological integrity of protected areas, particularly in terrestrial and freshwater ecosystems, has
tended to come from resource use by surrounding local communities, can be described as the various
initiatives aimed at decentralizing decision-making with respect to the management of biodiversity
(e.g., see Shyamsundar et al., 2005). Knox & Meinzen-Dick in Shyamsundar et al. (2005) discuss
decentralisation as part of a group of policies that are inter-related. The di⁄erent policies include:
￿ Deconcentration￿ the transfer of decision-making authority to lower level units of government;
￿ Decentralisation￿ the transfer of decision-making and payment responsibility to lower levels
of government;
￿ Privatisation￿ the transfer of public sector functions to the private sector or individuals; and
￿ Devolution￿ the transfer of rights and responsibilities to user groups at the local level.
The key decentralisation strategies that have been used in protected areas and biodiversity con-
servation since the 1980s are the integrated conservation and development projects (ICDPs) and
CBNRM, and many studies have been done to date on the successes and impacts these strategies
have had on protected areas and biodiversity (see Shyamsundar et al., 2005). In a very informative
and recent review of the ICDP/CBNRM literature, Shyamsundar (2005) investigated the following
key questions:
￿ What do we understand about the impacts of devolution, in terms of poverty reduction, bio-
diversity conservation, and ￿nancial implications for governments and local agencies?
￿ What are some of the conditions that contribute to success?
￿ What does the future hold for decentralised biodiversity conservation; that is, what are some
emerging challenges?
10On the ￿rst question, the empirical evidence on the impacts of devolution, in terms of poverty
reduction, biodiversity conservation, and ￿nancial implications for governments and local agencies
can be summarised, point-wise as follows:
￿ The general consensus within the literature is that CBNRM contributes positively to poverty
reduction, especially if one is willing to accept that enhanced community level bene￿ts (con-
trasted from household level bene￿ts) make a signi￿cant contribution to poverty reduction.
￿ The evidence suggests that where the opportunity costs and transaction costs of CBNRM out-
weigh their bene￿ts, CBNRM programmes do not result in enhanced biodiversity conservation.
￿ The evidence suggests that CBNRM programmes create public goods but they do not specif-
ically create incentives for those who conserve, nor do they punish households that engage
in activities inconsistent with the objectives of biodiversity conservation (e.g. poaching and
other illegal activities). There is thus an emerging concern that communities do not necessar-
ily link these tangible bene￿ts to the decision to conserve. It appears that whether CBNRM
programmes are having an impact on biodiversity conservation could be in￿ uenced by the
household￿ s perception of the distinction between community and household bene￿ts, and how
these relate to the biodiversity supplying these bene￿ts.
￿ That said, there is however some strong evidence showing that CBNRM has positive impacts
in terms of reducing poaching, improving perceptions, stronger rights and reducing con￿ icts
with the greater ecosystem surrounding protected areas.
￿ Finally, the ￿nancial implications for governments and local agencies depends on whether the
level of decentralisation is to a lower level of the central government bureaucracy, to a local
authority or to a community (tribal) level conservation institution.
On the second question, the existing empirical evidence suggests that the following factors can
contribute to the improved performance of CBNRM: congruence between clearly de￿ned resource
and governance boundaries, congruence between appropriation and provision rules and local con-
ditions, collective choice arrangements, localised monitoring, graduated sanctions, rapid access to
low cost con￿ ict resolution mechanisms, minimum recognition of rights by government authorities,
and governance activities being organised in multiple layers of nested enterprises in synchrony with
resource complexity (Ostrom, 1990).
On the ￿nal question, the challenges that need to be addressed by decentralized biodiversity
conservation are summarised as follows:
￿ Communities versus households￿ the basic argument is that the focus on communities
relative to households is a problem for biodiversity conservation (Emerton, 2001, Gibson,
1999). The bene￿ts based approach to biodiversity conservation as it currently exists is having
a positive e⁄ect on household preferences and attitudes toward biodiversity. However, there
is reason to believe that this may not be su¢ cient to meet biodiversity targets. Individual
household bene￿ts tend to be small relative to total household income.
￿ Heterogeneity within and between communities￿ communities engaged in biodiversity
conservation are rarely homogeneous entities that harmoniously agree to undertake biodiversity
conservation. Rather ￿con￿icting values and resource priorities￿ rather than shared beliefs
and interest￿ pervade social life￿ (Leach et al., 1999:230). Communities are characterised
by heterogeneity of endowments and interests. Further, whether a group of households can
be characterised as a community depends on the scale of analysis (ibid). These di⁄erences
can lead to unequal costs as a result of institutional change; di⁄ering stakeholder needs can
contribute to con￿ ict and impact conservation e⁄orts; compensation schemes might be needed
to redistribute costs and bene￿ts.
11￿ Competition/complementarity of institutions￿ decentralised biodiversity conservation
generally involves either the creation of new institutions or the assigning of new powers to an
existing institution. In either case, competition among institutions is inevitable. In addition,
any changes made a⁄ect both formal and informal institutions.
￿ Tenure over land and resources￿ biodiversity conservation programmes confer only usufruct
rights to local stakeholders, while ownership rights remain with the state. There are many
reasons why this is done. There are also reasons to be concerned about whether the lack of
ownership will weaken conservation e⁄orts in the long-run.
￿ Mismatch between ecological and social scales of management￿ decentralisation usu-
ally creates the problem of a mismatch between ecological and governance boundaries. This
problem can potentially be addressed by working with appropriate scales of regional manage-
ment.
￿ Financial sustainability￿ biodiversity conservation programmes are generally not self-sustained.
Support for these programmes usually comes from tourism and from international donors.
Tourism revenues vary depending on economic and political circumstances, while development
assistance is often a function of agendas that are far beyond the control of local stakehold-
ers. Thus, ￿nancial sustainability is an issue that each conservation area will need to con-
front. Looking beyond the ￿nancial sustainability of decentralised biodiversity programmes,
one needs to investigate the question of whether these programmes promote future investments
in biodiversity conservation.
￿ Institutions to address new threats￿ the traditional institutional analysis has concerned
itself with wanting protected area managers to in￿ uence land use outside protected areas by
local communities as opposed to big commercial interests such as commercial agriculture,
mining, property developers, etc. The major pressures on biodiversity outside protected areas,
and in some cases inside them as well, also includes outright loss of natural habitat (from
cultivation, mining, urban expansion, coastal development etc), ￿ ow modi￿cation (includes
over-abstraction of water, also altering e.g. seasonal ￿ ow of rivers) and invasive alien species.
In the South African context, these could actually be more signi￿cant than subsistence use
of natural resources by local communities. The challenge then would be to investigate which
institutions in￿ uence/regulate these major pressures.
A range of institutions-based incentives have been employed to encourage private landowners to
support conservation and complementary land uses in di⁄erent contexts. These include (i) providing
secure tenure (e.g. private rights to forest use and management), (ii) de￿ning clear use rights (e.g.
conditional use rights to use, hunt and sell wildlife on private land), (iii) improved tenure and use
rights through the creation of communal conservancies, wildlife management areas and contractual
parks etc. (Fabricius et al., 2004), (iv) promoting multiple use and best practice (e.g. use of eco-
friendly methods) and (v) the promotion of joint venture partnerships (Ashley, 1996; Emerton,
2001b; Tisdell, 2004).
At the national scale, in South Africa, institutions-based incentives have focused on (i) estab-
lishing appropriate institutions and lines of administration to manage ￿nances such that funds are
channeled where they are most needed and not ￿ trapped￿in a national treasury, which is far removed
from the management context, or reallocated for other purposes, (ii) providing secure tenure and use
rights, (iii) capturing positive externalities from government conservation e⁄orts, and (iv) promoting
diverse livelihood options for the single landowner or user, as well as across regions (Ashley, 1996;
Emerton, 2001b). Hence, government policies on land tenure may in￿ uence biodiversity conservation
to a greater extent than biodiversity targets at the national scale. The land claims process in South
Africa is such an example, and has been an e⁄ective mechanism by which local communities have
re-acquired land formerly belonging to them, but from which they were forcibly removed during the
12Apartheid era. Where land claims have been awarded in national parks, this has often resulted in
the establishment of contractual parks ￿a kind of joint venture partnership between government and
local communities, whereby the management authority leases the land from the community (usually
on a 99-year lease) and it remains within the national conservation estate, a joint management board
is established with decision-making authority, and economic bene￿ts generated from conservation
and tourism-based activities on the land, as well as from conservation or tourism levies (in some
instances), and channeled back into the community (Reid and Turner, 2004).
5 Conclusion and suggestions for further research
This paper accepted that biodiversity conservation in South Africa ought to take place both inside
and outside protected areas using a bioregional approach if biodiversity targets are to be met. A
framework for studying the factors a⁄ecting biodiversity conservation in bioregions was proposed
and it suggested that a range of social, technological, ecological, economic and political factors
drive biodiversity conservation in bioregions. The use of economic incentives was argued to be
a potentially more e⁄ective mechanism for mainstreaming biodiversity conservation in bioregions,
given that landowners are likely to respond to certain amenable economic approaches in making
land use decisions, than command-and-control systems. In many cases, a change of institutions is
all that is needed in order to provide economic incentives. Accordingly, institutions were singled out
as one important type of socioeconomic arrangement directly associated with economic incentives
which is likely to be a major determinant of the vulnerability or success of biodiversity conservation.
The foregoing discussion suggests several questions that should be addressed for an adequate
understanding and appropriate use of economic incentives in bioregions in South Africa. The ecology
side of bioregions has been studied widely and is relatively better understood. However, there is
a dearth of research on the socio-economic side of bioregions. Based on the analysis presented
in this paper, there are three themes dealing with socioeconomic issues, particularly institutional
arrangements, which could be placed on the research agenda, and which if answered, will enable
the crafting of well-functioning bioregions in South Africa. These themes are identi￿ed below as a
suggestion for further research:
1. How does one make a case for biodiversity conservation to policy makers from municipal to
national level, especially when the short-term opportunity cost of conservation is high? (i.e.
the public bene￿ts are far outweighed by the private bene￿ts)
2. Which institutions are most important in curbing the key drivers of biodiversity loss such as
habitat loss, ￿ ow modi￿cation, invasive species and overharvesting in speci￿c regions?
￿ What is the role of di⁄erent tenure systems? How does one deal with tenure changes
under claims for land restitution without decreasing biodiversity conservation outcomes?
￿ Where institutional change can enhance biodiversity conservation under bioregions, what
is the best way of implementing/facilitating institutional change to reduce the potential
for con￿ ict between current institutions and desired institutions?
￿ What institutional mechanisms does one need to protect critical biodiversity areas from
unsustainable land and resource use, especially by global capital?
￿ What advice would economics give to bioregions about what incentive mechanisms work
best at what spatial scale, and in which biome?
￿ How does one know when there is a case in which in￿ uencing behaviour in favour of
biodiversity conservation can only be achieved through command-and-control, vs. a case
in which behaviour can be in￿ uenced through incentives? In other words, when is it
appropriate to regulate rather than to use incentives?
133. What synergies exist or can be created between economics and spatial biodiversity planning?
￿ How can one achieve biodiversity conservation in spatial areas where one has less control,
unlike in a protected area where the level of control is much greater?
￿ What can economics do to corroborate the results from the systematic conservation plan-
ning framework?
￿ How does one integrate economic costs and bene￿ts into systematic conservation planning
through the appropriate valuation of ecosystem services?
￿ What is the signi￿cance of payment for ecosystem services for biodiversity planning?
￿ How can stakeholder heterogeneity be factored into the design and implementation of
systematic biodiversity conservation plans in bioregions?
References
[1] Aalders, I. 2008, Modeling land-use decision behavior with Bayesian belief networks, Ecology
and Society 13[1]: 16, online at http://www.ecologyandsociety.org/vol13/iss1/art16/.
[2] Agrawal, A. and Gibson, C. 1999, Enchantment and Disenchantment: The Role of Community
in Natural Resource Conservation, World Development 27 (4), 629-649.
[3] Agrawal, A. and Ostrom, E. 2001, Collective Action, Property Rights and Decentralization in
Resource Use in India and Nepal, Politics and Society 29(4), 485-514.
[4] Allison, Helen E. and Hobbs, Richard J. 2006, Science and Policy in Natural Resource Man-
agement: Understanding system complexity, Cambridge University Press.
[5] Aronson, J., Milton, S. and Blignaut, J.N. (Eds.) 2007, Restoring Natural Capital: Science,
Business and Practice, Island press.
[6] Ashley, C. 1996, Incentives a⁄ecting biodiversity conservation and sus-
tainable use: the case of land use options in Namibia, online at
http://www.met.gov.na/publications/research/rdp_0013.pdf.
[7] Aumann, R.J. 1997, Rationality and bounded rationality, Games and Economic Behavior 21,
2-14.
[8] Biggs, R., Bohensky, E., Desanker, P.V., Fabricius, C., Lynam, T., Misselhorn, A.A., Musvoto,
C., Mutale, M., Reyers, B., Scholes, R.J., Shikongo, S. & Van Jaarsveld, A.S. 2004, Nature
supporting people: the Southern African Millenium Ecosystem Assessment (integrated report),
Council for Scienti￿c and Industrial Research, Pretoria.
[9] Biggs, H,C, Pollard S and D du Toit (2007). Systemic links between Society, wetlands and
Woodlands. In Multiple Use Management of Natural Forests and Woodlands: Policy Re￿ne-
ments and Scienti￿c Progress. Natural Forests and Savanna Woodlands Symposium IV, Port
Elizabeth, 2006. Symposium Proceedings. Edited by: JJ Bester AHW Seydack T Vorster IJ
van der Merwe and S Dzivhani. Dept Water A⁄airs and Forestry. Pretoria.
[10] Biggs, H.C. & Rogers, K.H. 2003, ￿An adaptive system to link science, monitoring, and manage-
ment in practice,￿in The Kruger experience: ecology and management of savanna heterogeneity,
J.T. Du Toit, K.H. Rogers & H.C. Biggs, eds., Island Press, Washington, pp. 59-80.
[11] Blignaut, J.N. and Aronson, J. 2008, Getting serious about maintaining biodiversity, Conser-
vation letters 1(1),12-17.
14[12] Borrini-Feyerabend, G., Kothari, A. & Oviedo, G. 2004, Indigenous and local communities
and protected areas: towards equity and enhanced conservation, IUCN, Gland, Switzerland and
Cambridge, UK. xviii + 111pp.
[13] Cowling, R. M. 2005, ￿The process of mainstreaming: Conditions, constraints and prospects￿
in Mainstreaming biodiversity in production landscapes, C. Petersen and B. J. Huntley (eds.),
Global Environment Facility, Washington, DC, pp. 18￿ 25.
[14] Cowling, R. M., Pierce, S. M. and Sandwith. T. 2002, ￿Conclusions: The fundamentals of
mainstreaming biodiversity￿in Mainstreaming biodiversity in development: Case studies from
South Africa, S. M. Pierce, R. M. Cowling, T. Sandwith, and K. MacKinnon (eds.), World
Bank, Washington, DC, pp. 143￿ 53..
[15] DeFries, R., A. Hansen, B. L. Turner, R. Reid, and J. Liu. 2007, Land use change around
protected areas: management to balance human needs and ecological function, Ecological Ap-
plications 17, 1031￿ 1038.
[16] Department of Environmental A⁄airs and Tourism. National Environmental Management: Bio-
diversity Act 10 of 2004
[17] Department of Environmental A⁄airs and Tourism. Guideline regarding the Determination of
Bioregions and the Preparation and Publication of Bioregional Plans. 2007.
[18] DFID 1999, Sustainable livelihoods guidance sheets, online at http://www.livelihoods.org
[19] Driver, A, Maze, K, Rouget, M, Lombard, AT, Nel, J, Turpie, JK, Cowling, RM, Desmet, P,
Goodman, P, Harris, J, Jonas, Z, Reyers, B, Sink, K & Strauss, T. 2005, National Spatial Bio-
diversity Assessment 2004: Priorities for Biodiversity Conservation in South Africa. Strelitzia
17. Pretoria: South African National Biodiversity Institute.
[20] Du⁄y, S.B., Corson, M.S. & Grant, W.E. 2001, Simulating land-use decisions in the La Amistad
Biosphere Reserve bu⁄er zone in Costa Rica and Panama, Ecological Modelling 140[1-2], 9-29.
[21] Emerton, L. 2001a. ￿The Nature of Bene￿ts and the Bene￿ts of Nature. Why Wildlife Conser-
vation has not Economically Bene￿ted Communities in Africa.￿in African Wildlife and Liveli-
hoods. The Promise and Performance of Community Conservation, Hulme and Murphree, eds.,
James Currey Ltd, Oxford.
[22] Emerton, L. 2001b, Community-based incentives for nature conservation, online at
http://economics.iucn.org.
[23] Fabricius, C. 2004, ￿The fundamentals of community-based natural resource management,￿
in Rights, resources and rural development: community-based natural resource management in
Southern Africa, C. Fabricius, E. Koch, H. Magome & S. Turner, eds., Earthscan, London, pp.
3-43.
[24] Fabricius, C., Koch, E., Magome, H & Turner, S. (eds) 2004, Rights, resources and rural
development: community-based natural resource management in Southern Africa, Earthscan,
London.
[25] Field, B.C. 2002, Environmental economics: an introduction, 3rd edn, McGraw-Hill, New York.
[26] Forman,R.T.T. 1995, Land Mosaics. The Ecology of landscapes and regions, Cambridge Uni-
versity Press.
[27] Forrester, J. W. 1961, Industrial Dynamics, Productivity Press, Cambridge, USA.
15[28] Gans, J.S. 1996, On the impossibility of rational choice under incomplete information, Journal
of Economic Behavior and Organization 29, 287-309.
[29] Gibson, M. 1999, Politicians and Poachers. The Political Economy of Wildlife Policy in Africa.
Political Economy of Institutions and Decisions, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge.
[30] Grundy, I.M. & Michell, N. 2004, ￿Participatory forest management in South Africa,￿in In-
digenous forests and woodlands in South Africa: policy, people and practice, M.J. Lawes, H.A.C.
Eeley, C.M. Shackleton & B.G.S. Geach, eds., University of KwaZulu-Natal Press, Durban, pp.
679-712.
[31] Gunderson, L.H. & Holling, C.S. 2002, Panarchy: understanding transformations in human and
natural systems, Island Press, Washington DC.
[32] Gunderson, L.H., Holling, C.S. & Light, S. 1995, Barriers and bridges to renewal of ecosystems
and institutions, Columbia University Press, New York.
[33] Gupta, A.K. 1999, Science, sustainability and social purpose: barriers to e⁄ective articulation,
dialogue and utilization of formal and informal science in public policy, International Journal
of Sustainable Development 2[3], 368-371.
[34] Hansen, A. J., and DeFries, R. 2007, Ecological mechanisms linking protected areas to sur-
rounding lands, Ecological Applications 17, 974￿ 988.
[35] Holling, C.S., Berkes, F. & Folke, C. 1998, ￿Science, sustainability and resource management,￿
in Linking social and ecological systems: management practices and social mechanisms for build-
ing resilience, F. Berkes & C. Folke, eds., Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, pp. 342-359.
[36] Jansen, H.G.P., Pender, H., Damon, A. & Schipper, R. 2006, Rural development policies and
sustainable land use in the hillside areas of Honduras: a quantitative livelihoods approach,
Research report 147, International Food Policy Research Institute, Washington DC.
[37] Kumar, P. 2005, Market for Ecosystem Services, International Institute for Sustainable Devel-
opment Report, online at http://www.iisd.org.
[38] Leach, M., Mearns, R. and Scoones, I. 1999, Environmental Entitlements: Dynamics and Insti-
tutions in Community-Based Natural Resource Management, World Development 27(2), 225-
247.
[39] Lebel, L., Anderies, J.M., Campbell, B., Folke, C., Hat￿eld-Dodds, S., Hughes, T.P. & Wilson,
J. 2006, Governance and the capacity to manage resilience in regional social-ecological systems,
Ecology and Society 11[1], online at http://www.ecologyandsociety.org/vol11/iss1/art19.
[40] Meadows, D. H. and Robinson, J. M. 1985, The Electronic Oracle: Computer Models and Social
Decisions, Wiley, Chichester, UK.
[41] Meinzen-Dick, R. & Adato, M. 2001, Applying the Sustainable Livelihoods Frame-
work to Impact Assessment in Integrated Natural Resource Management, online at
www.ciat.cgiar.org/inrm/workshop2001/docs/titles/4-2BPaperRMeinzen-Dick.pdf
[42] Millennium Ecosystem Assessment 2003, Ecosystems and Human Well Being: Current State
and Trends, online at http://www.millenniumassessment.org.
[43] Millenium Ecosystem Assessment 2005, Ecosystems and human well-being: synthesis. Island
Press, Washington DC.
16[44] More, T.A., Averill, J.R. & Stevens, T.H. 1996, Values and economics in environmental man-
agement: a perspective and critique, Journal of Environmental Management 48, 397-409.
[45] Ostr￿m, E. 1990, Governing the commons: the evolution of institutions for collective action,
Cambridge University Press, Cambridge.
[46] Pearce, D.W. & Turner, R.K. 1990, Economics of natural resources and the environment, Har-
vester Wheatsheaf, New York.
[47] Pierce, S. M., Cowling, R. M., Sandwith, T. and MacKinnon, K. ed. 2002, Mainstreaming
biodiversity in development: Case studies from South Africa, World Bank, Washington, DC.
[48] Reid, H. & Turner, S. 2004, ￿The Richtersveld and Makuleke contractual parks in South
Africa: win-win for communities and conservation?￿in Rights, resources and rural development:
community-based natural resource management in Southern Africa, C. Fabricius, E. Koch, H.
Magome & S. Turner, eds., Earthscan, London, pp. 223-234.
[49] Republic of South Africa 1998, National Forests Act, Act no. 84 of 1998, Government printers.
[50] Salfsky, N and Wollenberg, E 2000, Linking Livelihoods and Conservation: A Conceptual
Framework and Scale for assessing the integration of Human Needs and Biodiversity, World
Development 28(8), 1421-1438
[51] Sche⁄er, M. & Carpenter, S.R. 2003, Catastrophic regime shifts in ecosystems: linking theory
to observation, Trends in Ecology and Evolution 18(12), 648-656.
[52] Scoones, I. 1998, Sustainable rural livelihoods: a framework for analysis, IDS working paper
72, online at http://www.sarpn.org.za/rpp/land.php.
[53] Secretariat of the Convention on Biological Diversity 2001, Assessment, Conservation and Sus-
tainable Use of Forest Biodiversity, CBD Technical Series Report No. 3, Montreal.
[54] Sent, E. 2004, The legacy of Herbert Simon in game theory, Journal of Economic Behavior and
Organization 53, 303-317.
[55] Seydack, Armin (Dr), Personal communication, SANParks Knysna O¢ ce.
[56] Shackleton, C.M., Shackleton, S.E. and Cousins, B. 2001, The role of land-based strategies in
rural livelihoods, the contribution of arable production, animal husbandry and natural resource
harvesting in communal areas in South Africa, Development Southern Africa 18, 581-604.
[57] Shackleton, S. & Shackleton, C. 2004, ￿Everyday resources are valuable enough for community-
based natural resource management programme support: evidence from South Africa,￿ in
Rights, resources and rural development: community-based natural resource management in
Southern Africa, C. Fabricius, E. Koch, H. Magome & S. Turner, eds., Earthscan, London, pp.
135-146.
[58] Shyamsundar, P., Araral, E. and Weeraratne, S. 2005, Devolution of Resource Rights, Poverty
and Natural Resource Management: A Review. Environment Economic Series Paper No. 104
[59] Tisdell, C.A. 2004, Economic incentives to conserve wildlife on private lands: analysis and
policy, The Environmentalist 24, 153-163.
[60] Tomlin, C. Dana 1990, Geographic Information Systems and Cartographic Modelling, Prentice-
Hall.
17[61] Turpie, J. 2008, Incorporating economic costs and bene￿ts into systematic conservation plan-
ning: a case study of South African estuaries. A paper presented at the 2008 Biodiversity
Planning Forum, Mpekweni.
[62] Walker, B.H. 1993, Rangeland ecology: understanding and managing change, Ambio 22[2-3],
80-87.
[63] Wiens, J.A. 1992, ￿Ecological Flows across landscape boundaries: a conceptual overview￿in
Landscape Boundaries, F de Castri (ed), Springer Verlag, New York, pp. 216-235.
[64] Willis, C.B. 2004, ￿Policy frameworks pertaining to the conservation and sustainable use of
forests and woodlands in South Africa,￿in Indigenous forests and woodlands in South Africa:
policy, people and practice, M.J. Lawes, H.A.C. Eeley, C.M. Shackleton & B.G.S. Geach, eds.,
University of KwaZulu-Natal Press, Durban, pp. 77-107.
[65] Wolmer, W. 2003, Transboundary conservation: the politics of ecological integrity in the Great
Limpopo Transfrontier Park, Journal of Southern African Studies 29(1), 261-278.
[66] World Resources Institute 2005, Resource tenure and property rights: access and ownership,
online at http://www.grida.no/wrr/pdf/wrr05_ch3.pdf.
[67] Zunckel, K. 2008, A model for trade in ecosystems services in the KZN and Eastern Cape
Drakensberg. A paper presented at the 2008 Biodiversity Planning Forum, Mpekweni.
18 
Box 1.4: Extent of development







Ecosystem goods & services 
Box 1.5: Economic approaches 
Cost benefit analysis 



















Box 1.1: Land use mosaic 
Financial  Physical 




Box 1.2: People’s assets 
Communal 
State  Private 
Commons 
Box 1.3: Tenure arrangements  
Employment 
Income  Health 
Food 
consumption 













Box 1: Localised socio-ecological-economic system
Space 
Time 
Short-   Long-  
term  term 
 
 
Figure 1: Conceptual framework for understanding the economics of bioregional land use mosaics 
19